INTRODUCTION
Consider a seller interested in selling several indivisible objects. If each buyer's valuation of each object is independent of the other object(s) he obtains then a simple auction procedure such as a series of second-price auctions, one for each object, allocates the objects efficiently. If, instead, a buyer's reservation value for an object depends on which other objects he obtains and the buyer has utility for consuming more than one objectwe refer to this as interdependent valuesthen it is not known whether a simple selling mechanism can allocate the objects efficiently.
A recent example of a market with many indivisible objects for sale to buyers with interdependent values is the auction of a few thousand licenses for personal communication services (PCS) spectrum rights conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Each bidder's value for a given license depends upon the other licenses it obtains. 1 A second example is the sale of foreclosed real estate by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Many of the buyers are commercial enterprises who acquire article no. ET962269
properties for resale. Due to risk aversion, economies of scale and scope, and financial constraints, these buyers can have interdependent values. Consequently, an efficient allocation of resources may not be achieved by a simple auction.
When buyers have interdependent values for several indivisible objects, a Vickrey auction in which bidders submit bids on every conceivable bundle of objects assures an efficient allocation. However, a mechanism in which bids are invited on all bundles is too complex to implement. The combinatorial problem involved in solving for the optimal allocation of bundles to buyers is beyond the capabilities of current optimization techniques. 2 Only simple selling procedures, such as one auction for each object, are practical. Therefore, an immediate question is when do simple auction procedures which determine a price for each object allocate efficiently? And if such auction procedures are usually inefficient, can efficiency be attained in a resale market after the auction?
As a first step towards answering these questions, we analyze an economy in which (i) all commodities except money are indivisible, (ii) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle of indivisible objects, and (iii) all agents are price-takers. We investigate conditions under which perfectly competitive markets are able to allocate resources in this exchange economy. Specifically, we ask whether there exist prices, one for each commodity, such that there is no excess demand for any commodity. After having identified sufficient conditions for existence of market clearing prices, the next step is to investigate whether, under these conditions, simple auction procedures are capable of discovering the competitive equilibrium prices. If market clearing prices do not exist, or if the conditions necessary for existence are too restrictive, then we believe it is unlikely that any simple auction procedure or a postauction resale market will allocate resources efficiently.
The exchange economy considered here is related to an assignment market (see Koopmans and Beckman [18] , and Shapley and Shubik [25] ). The difference is that in assignment markets each agent desires only one indivisible objects whereas in our model agents have interdependent values over several indivisible objects. Another related group of papers are Quinzii [22] , Gale [11] , and Kaneko and Yamamoto [15] . These authors consider an exchange economy which is less general than the one considered in this paper in that each buyer has utility for one object only and more general in that they allow utility functions with income effects. This paper is also related to the matching literature. Although we do not impose a two-sided restriction in that an agent can be both a buyer and a seller, there is a sense in which this model is equivalent to a twosided many-to-one matching market. Kelso and Crawford [16] analyze an auction procedure for a two-sided many-to-one matching market. As pointed out later in Section 3.2, Kelso and Crawford's results provide a sufficient condition for existence of competitive equilibrium in our setting.
The problems presented by interdependent values over several indivisible objects have received little attention in the literature on optimal selling mechanisms. In auction theory it is often assumed that either there is one indivisible object for sale or there are several identical units for sale and each buyer's marginal value for more than one unit is zero. 3 Under either assumption, an efficient allocation is achieved by several commonly observed simple auction mechanisms and also by a competitive equilibrium. Other papers, such as Adams and Yellen [1] , Harris and Raviv [13] , and Palfrey [21] , on selling several indivisible objects assume that buyers' values are additive, i.e., independent. The objective in these papers is to devise selling strategies which maximize a monopolist's profits; the existence of efficient mechanisms is not an issue. If buyers' values are additive, then simultaneous sealed bid auctions, one for each object, are efficient under a variety of informational assumptions; moreover, a competitive equilibrium exists and is efficient. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 it is shown that market clearing prices exist if and only if the Pareto-frontier in the exchange economy with indivisible goods coincides with the Pareto-frontier of a transformed economy with only divisible goods. The link between our model and a two-sided matching market is discussed. After stating further assumptions on agents' preferences in Section 4, in Section 5 we apply these necessary and sufficient conditions to the case when agents' reservation value functions are supermodular. Counterexamples to existence of equilibrium are provided in Section 6, and a discussion of implications for simple market mechanisms is given in Section 7. But first, we describe the model in the next section.
THE MODEL AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Consider an exchange economy with n indivisible commodities and m agents. We assume that there is one unit of each commodity. This is without loss of generality as different units of the same commodity may be treated as different commodities. 4 Each agent i, i=1, 2, ..., m, has a reservation value function defined over bundles of objects, V i (S), for all SN=[1, 2, ..., n], with V i (,)=0. The reservation value functions are weakly increasing, i.e., if T/S then V i (T )V i (S). Free disposal is a sufficient condition for weakly increasing reservation value functions. Agent i is prepared to pay at most V i (S) for the bundle S. Thus, the utility of an agent with subset S and wealth level w,i s
This utility function with no income effects is less general than is usually assumed in general equilibrium models; however, this utility specification is common in the auction and bargaining literatures (much of which assumes one indivisible object).
By assumption, wealth is divisible. Agent i's initial endowment of wealth is w i . We assume that w i V i (N), \i: it is feasible for agent i to purchase all commodities in any subset S when the sum of the prices of the objects in S is less than V i (S). Under this assumption, the initial endowment of objects to the m agents is irrelevant for the existence of market clearing prices. That is, for a given set of reservation value functions for m agents over subsets of n objects, either there exist market clearing prices for all possible initial endowments of n objects to m agents (and the set of market clearing prices and market allocations is the same for all initial endowments) or there do not exist market clearing prices for any initial endowment. Therefore, we leave the initial endowment of objects unspecified. 5 All agents are price takers. 6 An economy which satisfies the conditions above is denoted by
A feasible allocation of objects to agents is an allocation in which no object is assigned more than once. Thus (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) denotes a feasible allocation in which agent i is allocated the bundle S i N, i=1, 2, ..., m, and S i & S i $ =, for all i{i$. It is possible that in a feasible allocation some agents get nothing (S i =, for some i) andor some objects are not allocated (N"( i S i ){,). 4 See the end of this section for a more precise statement of this claim. 5 In FCC auctions and in RTC auctions, one agent (the seller) is initially endowed with all the objects. 6 As there is only one indivisible unit of supply for every object, it may seem unreasonable to assume that sellers are price-takers. However, as explained below, our analysis is easily adapted to the case of many units of each object. Further, an objective of this paper is to investigate when competitive equilibrium prices exist and achieve allocative efficiency so that under these conditions it may be possible to find an auction or some other mechanism capable of discovering these prices.
BIKHCHANDANI AND MAMER
An efficient allocation is a feasible allocation which maximizes the sum of the reservation values of the agents. Thus, (S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m *) is an efficient allocation if for all other feasible allocations (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ),
As there are a finite number of feasible allocations of commodities to agents, each economy has an efficient allocation. It is possible that at an efficient allocation (S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m *), some objects are not allocated:
Clearly 
, where (S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m *) is an efficient allocation. The standard Pareto-frontier in utility space is obtained by translating the Pareto-frontier in reservation value space by an amount equal to the aggregate wealth endowment in the economy.
Market clearing prices are prices, one for each commodity, at which there is no excess demand for any commodity. If such prices exist, then the demand for each object is either one unit or zero and the market results in a feasible allocation. Thus, p k 0, k=1, 2, ..., n are market clearing prices (or competitive equilibrium prices) if there is a feasible allocation (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) such that
:
When (2) and (3) are satisfied, (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) is said to be a market allocation which is supported by prices p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n , p k 0. We require (2) to hold for all subsets of N rather than only those in an agent's budget set, whatever that set may be. 7 The reason is that any subset S which lies outside an agent's budget set yields less utility than consuming nothing and will never be chosen. This follows from the assumption w i V i (N)V i (S), \i and the fact that if a subset S is outside agent i 's budget set then k # S p k >w i . Equation (3) is Walras' law. An equivalent statement of (3) is that the price of any object which is unallocated at a market allocation is zero:
We refer to V i (S i )& k # Si p k , the difference between agent i's reservation value for his allocation S i and the valuation of S i at market prices, as agent i's consumer surplus. 8 The following lemma is immediate:
Thus, since we assume that w i V i (N), the initial endowment of wealth has no further bearing on the existence of market clearing prices. The commodities and reservation value functions are enough to specify the economy and we may write
It is well known that market clearing prices may not exist in the presence of indivisibilities (see Henry [14] , Arrow and Hahn [2] , and Ellickson [10] ). An example is presented below. There are two agents, A and B, and three objects, 1, 2, and 3. The reservation value functions of A and B are given in Table 1 .
In this example, there are two efficient allocations: all three objects are assigned to one of the two agents. In light of Proposition 1 below, these two efficient allocations are the only feasible allocations that could be supported by prices. Any prices, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , that support the efficient allocation S A =[1, 2, 3], S B =, must satisfy p 1 + p 2 3, p 2 +p 3 3, and p 3 + p 1 3, else B could do better than buy nothing. But this implies that A will not buy S A = [1, 2, 3] at these prices as p 1 + p 2 + p 3 4 } 5>4= V A ( [1, 2, 3] ). Hence, no feasible allocation is supported by market clearing prices.
However, as the next result shows, when the market works at all, it works well. Proposition 1. If market clearing prices exist in an economy E I , then the market allocation must be an efficient allocation.
Proof. Suppose that p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n , p k 0, are market clearing prices and that (S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m *) is the market allocation supported by these prices. Let (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) be any other allocation. Condition (2) implies that
Consequently,
From (4) we know that p k =0 for all k # S "S*. Thus, the above inequality implies that
Hence, (S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m *) is an efficient allocation. K
As stated at the beginning of this section, the assumption of one unit supply of each object is without loss of generality. In case there are multiple units of some objects, one can expand the commodity space by treating each unit of an object as a different commodity. It may be verified that market clearing prices exist in the original economy with multiple units per object if and only if market clearing prices exist in the new economy with one unit per object. Moreover, the sets of market allocations supported by equilibrium prices in the two economies (which may be empty sets) are identical, except for relabelling.
A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION
We show that market clearing prices exist in an economy with indivisibilities if and only if the agents' welfare cannot be improved bỳ`m aking'' the commodities divisible in a sense made precise below.
be an economy with indivisible commodities as defined in the previous section. We define a divisible trans-
, where S 0 =,, be an enumeration of all the subsets of N. Each agent i's divisible allocation in E D (N,(V i )) consists of a collection of fractions of subsets and is represented as a 2 n &1 vector, X i =(x i1 , x i2 , ..., x i 2 n &1 ). If agent i gets fraction f of the jth subset, j=1,2,...,2 n &1, then x ij = f.I fx ij =0, \j1, then agent i gets S 0 , the empty subset. Let A be a n_(2 n &1) matrix such that if object k is in subset S j , j1, then a kj =1; otherwise a kj =0. Define
s.t. :
x ij 1 (7)
x ij 0, \j.
Constraints (6) in the above linear program ensure that no more than y ik of each commodity k is allocated at any feasible solution, and constraint (7) restricts the sum of fractions of subsets allocated to less than one.
The following lemma proves that W i is a concave extension of V i from the corners of the unit cube in R n to the entire unit cube.
Lemma 2. (i) W i is a well-defined, finite-valued, concave function.
(ii) W i coincides with V i at all extreme points of the unit cube in R n , the only points at which V i is defined.
Proof. See Appendix. K It may seem that Lemma 2 cannot be true in the case with multiple units of some goods. Consider an economy with two apples and two oranges. Suppose that an agent strictly prefers a 50 : 50 gamble over two apples and two oranges to a bundle with one apple and one orange. That is, 0.5V (2, 0)+0.5V (0, 2)>V (1, 1).
How could this reservation value function have a concave extension? Clearly V ( } ) does not have a concave extension in R 2 ; Lemma 2 claims that there is a concave extension in R 
where V( } ) is the new reservation value function. A concave extension of V( } ) on the unit cube in R 4 is not ruled out by (9); by Lemma 2, we know that this concave extension exists.
The generalizations of feasible and efficient allocations to the divisible economy are straightforward. A feasible divisible allocation, Y i =(y i1 , y i2 , ..., y in ), i=1, 2, ..., m, is one which satisfies m i=1 y ik 1, \k=1, 2, ..., n.A nefficient divisible allocation is a feasible divisible allocation, Y 1 *, Y 2 *, ..., Y m * , such that for any other feasible divisible allocation,
A feasible allocation (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) in an economy E I induces in its transformed divisible economy a feasible divisible allocation (
where for all i, y ik =0 if k S i and y ik =1 if k # S i , \k. An implication of the definitions and of Lemma 2(ii) is that if S 1 *, S 2 *, ..., S m * , is an efficient allocation in E I and
. Thus, the Pareto-frontiers of E I and E D are parallel hyperplanes in R m + , with the Pareto-frontier of E D (weakly) above that of E I .
As E D is an economy in which all goods are divisible and consumers have concave utility functions, any point on the Pareto-frontier of this economy can be allocated through competitive prices. Therefore, it is to be expected that if the Pareto-frontier of E I coincides with that of E D then market clearing prices exist in E I . Surprisingly, the converse is also true. It follows from the definitions that if one efficient allocation in E I induces an efficient divisible allocation in E D then all efficient allocations in E I induce efficient divisible allocations in E D . The rest of this section is devoted to proving Proposition 2.
Consider the following:
Integer Program (IP):
x ij =0 or 1, \i, j.
The optimal solution set to IP is the set of efficient allocations in
linear programming relaxation of IP is
Linear Programming Relaxation (LPR):
x ij 0, \i, j.
The constraints x ij 1, \i, j, are implied by (14) and therefore are not included above. LPR has the dual:
Dual of LPR (DLPR):
As E I always has an efficient allocation, IP has a finite optimal solution. The feasible region of LPR is a nonempty convex polytope. Thus LPR has a finite optimal solution, which in turn implies that DLPR is feasible and has a finite optimal solution. Let M IP denote the value of an optimal solution to IP, and let M LPR and M DRLP be the values of optimal solutions to LPR and DLPR, respectively. Thus,
where the equality follows from the duality theorem of linear programming (see Dantzig [8, p. 125] ), and the inequality from the fact that the feasible region of LPR includes the feasible region of IP. Next, we show that the sum of the reservation values of agents at an
Proof. See Appendix. K Hence, the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2 may be restated as M IP =M LPR , and Proposition 2 follows from the following lemma. The proof of the``if '' part uses the well known idea that the dual solution may be interpreted as competitive prices supporting an optimal solution of the primal.
Lemma 4. Market clearing prices exist in E I if and only if any optimal solution to IP is an optimal solution to LPR, i.e., M IP =M LPR .
Proof. Let X*=(x ij *), i=1, 2, ..., m, j=1,2,...,2 n &1 be an optimal solution to LPR and let P*=(p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n *) and 6*=(? 1 *, ? 2 *, ..., ? n *) be an optimal solution to DLPR. That is, X* is LPR feasible, (P*, 6*) is DLPR feasible and
The complementary slackness conditions (see Dantzig [8, pp. 135136] ) are _ 1& :
_ 1& :
We show below that p k *, k=1, 2, ..., n, are prices of the n objects which`s upport'' the efficient divisible allocation X*. That is, if x ij *>0 then these prices satisfy (2) with S i =S j . And if an object is not fully used up at the allocation X*, then its price is zero. In addition, we show that ? i * is agent i's consumer surplus, i=1, 2, ..., m. First, observe that (17) implies that if
where the equality follows from (19) and the inequality from the feasibility of (P*, 6*) in DLPR. This, together with ? i *0, implies that the prices p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n * support the allocation x ij *. From (20) it is clear that each agent i 's per unit subset consumer surplus is identical for all subsets of which he receives positive amounts; this surplus is equal to ? i *. From (18) it follows that if 2 n &1 j=1 x ij *<1 then ? i *=0. Thus, ? i * is agent i 's consumer surplus.
To prove sufficiency, suppose that M IP =M LPR . Consequently, there exists a solution X*=x ij *, i=1, 2, ..., m, j=1, 2, ..., 2 n &1 which is feasible and optimal for both IP and LPR. Moreover, X* is a feasible and efficient allocation in E I . The preceding argument implies that the DLPR optimal variables p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n * are prices which support X*i nE I . To prove necessity, suppose that p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n *, p k *0, are market clearing prices which support (S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j m ), 10 a feasible allocation in E I .
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BIKHCHANDANI AND MAMER 9 The definition of consumer surplus in Section 2 is modified to 10 For each i, S j i , the subset allocated to agent i, is the j i th element, 0 j i 2 n &1 in the enumeration of subsets of N.
From Proposition 1 we know that (S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j m ) is an efficient allocation. Define
As the prices p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n * support (S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j m ), we have ? i *0 and
Thus, p k * and ? i * are dual feasible. This, together with (16), implies that
where the second to last equality follows from the fact that (S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j m ) is feasible and that p k *=0 for all k m i=1 S j i , and the last equality from the efficiency of (S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j m ). Thus (16) implies that M LPR =M IP . K
The optimal solutions to the integer programming formulation of an assignment market and to the associated linear programming relaxation are the same. Therefore, the dual linear program yields prices that decentralize efficient allocations in assignment markets (see Koopmans and Beckman [18] ). In our setting, the equivalence between the integer programming formulation and its linear programming relaxation depends on the existence of market clearing prices.
In the proof of Lemma 4, X* and (P*, 6*) were arbitrary optimal solutions to LPR and DLPR respectively. Therefore, the following corollary is immediate: Corollary 1. If one efficient allocation in E I is supported by a price vector ( p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n *), then all efficient allocations in E I are supported by ( p 1 *, p 2 *, ..., p n *).
It is clear from the definition of competitive equilibrium that market clearing prices are nonnegative and bounded from above by max i V i (N).
In addition, the proof of Lemma 4 implies that if market clearing prices exist in E I , then these prices constitute part of an optimal solution to DLPR. As the optimal solution set to a linear program is closed and convex, we have 11 Corollary 2. The set of market clearing prices in E I is a closed, bounded, convex (and possibly empty) set.
The balancedness condition in cooperative game theory (see Bondareva [5] and Shapley [24] ) states that a function V( }) defined on subsets S j of a finite set N is balanced if for any vector (* 1 , * 2 , ..., * 2 n &1 ), * j 0, such that \k # N, j : k # S j * j =1 we have Proof. Suppose that x ij , i=1, 2, ..., m, j=1,2,...,2 n &1 is in the feasible region of LPR. Thus, j :
Clearly, (* j ) is a vector of balancing weights and * j m i=1 x ij , j=1,2,...,2 n &1. Thus,
where the first inequality follows from * j m i=1 x ij , \j and the second from balancedness. Thus, LPR has an integer optimal solution and M IP =M LPR . K The necessary and sufficient condition obtained in this section can be used to check for existence in specific examples. 13 This condition could also be used to obtain conditions on agents' preferences which ensure existence. Before considering several assumptions on the agents' reservation value functions in Section 4, we present three extensions of our results in Section 3.1 and relate the indivisible economy E I to a matching market in Section 3.2.
Extensions

1.
If the endowment of at least one object is greater than one unit, then by converting this economy into an equivalent economy with one unit of each object (as explained at the end of Section 2) the results of this section provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium prices in the original economy (with multiple units of some objects). Alternatively, one can obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for existence by directly transforming the economy with multiple units of some objects into an equivalent divisible economy using a straightforward extension of (5). With the exception of the analog of Lemma 2(ii), all the results proved so far remain true.
2.
We have assumed throughout that agents are free to buy any subset they want. One could, instead, assume that agents' choices are limited to T, a subset of the set of all subsets of N. This would entail the following changes:
(i) A feasible allocation (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) must satisfy S i & S i $ =,, \i{i $, and \i, S i # T (rather than S i N).
(ii) The qualifier \SN in (2) is replaced by \S # T.
(iii) The definition of efficient allocation remains the same; however, an efficient allocation under the earlier definition of a feasible allocation may no longer be feasible.
(iv) In the proofs and definitions, all summations 2 n &1 j=1 are replaced by S # T .
With these changes, all the results proved so far, except the analog of Lemma 2(ii), remain true.
3.
Another divisible transformation of the indivisible economy is obtained by excluding the constraint j x ij 1 from the linear program (5) (and therefore, excluding constraints (14) from LPR and the variables ? i from DLPR). The analog of Lemma 2(ii) does not hold for this divisible transformation, and Proposition 2 is modified to: Market clearing prices which give each agent zero consumer surplus exist in an indivisible economy if and only if an efficient allocation in the indivisible economy induces an efficient divisible allocation in the divisible economy. This necessary and sufficient condition is satisfied when agents' reservation values are additive.
The proofs of each of these extensions mimic arguments used in this section and are omitted.
An Exchange Economy as a Two-Sided Matching Market
A transfer of an indivisible object from one agent to another in the economy considered here may be thought of as a match between the two agents. Thus, the exchange economy is a matching market without the two-sidedness restriction as each agent in this economy may be a buyer of certain objects and a seller of others.
14 One can transform an exchange economy E I into a two-sided exchange economy E TS such that market clearing prices exist in E I if and only if market clearing prices exist in E TS . This is shown below.
Given an economy E I =[N,(V i ), i=1, 2, ..., m] and any initial endowment of the set N to the agents i=1, 2, ..., m, define two economies with the same set N of indivisible commodities: In E$ I , the initial endowment of the indivisible objects is the same as in E I . As agents m+1, m+2, ..., m+n have no initial endowments and have no utility for the objects, they play no role in E$ I . Thus, market clearing prices exist in E I if and only if market clearing prices exist in E$ I .
In E TS , agents i=1, 2, ..., m are (potential) buyers and have no initial endowment of any indivisible object. Agents i=m+1, m+2, ..., m+n are sellers with agent m+k being endowed with one unit of object k, k= 1, 2, ..., n. As noted in Section 2, since there are no budget constraints (i.e., w i V i (N)) the existence of market clearing prices depends only on the agents' reservation values and on the aggregate endowments (i.e., the set N) but not on how the aggregate endowments are distributed among the agents. Hence, market clearing prices exist in E TS if and only if market clearing prices exist in E$ I , and by the argument in the preceding paragraph, if and only if market clearing prices exist in E I . The efficient allocations and (as an examination of (2) and (4) reveals) the set of market clearing prices in E I , E$ I , and E TS are identical. Kelso and Crawford [16] analyze two-sided matching markets with money. The two sides they considerfirms and workerscorrespond to buyers and sellers in E TS in that many sellers (workers) may be matched to one buyer (firm) but not vice versa. As workers have intrinsic preferences over which firm they are matched with, it is natural in the Kelso and Crawford model to allow different salaries (prices) for a worker depending where he works. In our setting, as sellers will sell only to a buyer who offers the highest price, the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes would be unchanged even if one allowed prices to be buyer dependent. Hence, the results in Kelso and Crawford apply directly here.
Consider the following condition from Kelso and Crawford's paper. For any price vector P= (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p k , . .., p n ), let
For any two price vectors P and P and subset S define
An exchange economy satisfies the gross substitutes assumption if for every agent i,i fS i # M i ( P ) and P P, then there exists S i # M i (P ) such that T(S i , P, P )S i . Thus, different objects are substitutes in the sense that the demand for an object does not decrease if prices of some other objects increase. Kelso and Crawford provide an ascending-price auction procedure in which buyers propose prices for objectsa variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley [12] . This auction procedure leads to a competitive equilibrium when the gross substitutes assumption is satisfied. Hence, the gross substitutes condition is sufficient for existence of market clearing prices. Further, they show that the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs in E TS coincides with its core (whether or not the gross substitutes assumption is satisfied). Roth [23] generalizes the KelsoCrawford framework to a twosided many-to-many matching market and provides two auction procedures (one in which buyers propose and another in which sellers propose) which lead to a competitive equilibrium under the gross substitutes assumption.
By viewing an exchange economy as a two-sided matching market one obtains market mechanisms which, under certain conditions, converge to competitive equilibrium outcomes. In a setting where many heterogeneous objects are sold to buyers who buy at most one object, Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [9] show that an ascending price mechanism (a special case of an algorithm proposed by Crawford and Knoer [7] ) converges to the minimum competitive price and that this mechanism is not individually manipulable by the buyers.
FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS ON AGENTS' PREFERENCES
A reservation value function, V i ,i ssuperadditive if for all S, TN such that S & T=,
The example in Table 1 of Section 2 implies that superadditivity is not sufficient for the existence of market clearing prices. The following assumption is stronger. A reservation value function, V i ,i ssupermodular if for all S, TN
Supermodularity implies that the products are complements. To see this, note that an alternative (and equivalent) definition of supermodularity is the following. For all
Under supermodular preferences, the marginal value for T 3 increases with an agent's current level of possessions. Preferences are strictly supermodular if the inequality in (22) is strict whenever S 3 T 3 S (or equivalently if the inequality in (23) is strict whenever T 2 {, and T 3 {,). From (22) it is clear that supermodularity implies superadditivity. If N contains at most two objects then superadditivity implies supermodularity.
Agents' preferences are (i) subadditive if the inequality in (21) is reversed, and (ii) submodular if the inequality in (22) is reversed. Submodular preferences are subadditive. Preferences are additive if the inequality in (22) is replaced by an equality, or equivalently, if
where + i is an additive measure. Prices
] support an efficient allocation in an economy where agents' reservation value functions satisfy (24).
SUPERMODULAR PREFERENCES
A supermodular reservation value function is balanced. Therefore, Corollary 3 of Section 3 implies that if all agents have the same supermodular reservation value function then market clearing prices exist. The following proposition extends this to two types of agents with supermodular reservation value functions which are strictly increasing (i.e., V i (S)>V i (T) for all T/S, S 3 T ).
Proposition 3. Suppose there are two types of agents in an indivisible economy E I type 1 agents with reservation value function V 1 and type 2 TABLE 2 Nonexistence with Supermodular Preferences
agents with reservation value function V 2 . Further, suppose that both V 1 and V 2 are strictly supermodular and strictly increasing. Then market clearing prices exist.
Proof. See Appendix. K The agents' consumer surpluses at the market clearing prices constructed in the proof of Proposition 3 is zero. This is not accidental. Using Extension 3 of Section 3, it can shown that if agents' reservation values are supermodular and market clearing prices exist, then there also exist market clearing prices which give each agent zero consumer surplus.
The following example (for which we are grateful to Bhaskar Dutta) shows that supermodularity is not enough to ensure the existence of market clearing prices. There are three objects, 1, 2, and 3, and three agents, A, B, and C in this example (Table 2 ). An efficient indivisible allocation is S A =[1, 2, 3], S B =S C =, which yields M IP =40, whereas the efficient divisible allocation is S A = This example also shows that Proposition 3 cannot be generalized to three types of agents with supermodular reservation values.
COUNTEREXAMPLES AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Although we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of market clearing prices (Proposition 2), we have been less successful at identifying sufficient conditions on agents' preferences. Market clearing prices exist when (i) all agents have additive reservation values, and when (ii) all agents have supermodular reservation value functions and are either identical or of two types. The example in Table 2 of Section 5, shows that supermodular preferences are not sufficient for existence of competitive equilibrium. We provide a few counterexamples to existence under other assumptions on preferences.
First, consider the following example from Kelso and Crawford [16] . As shown in Table 3 below, two buyers, A and B, have submodular Consider the following property, which is stronger than submodularity. A reservation value function, V i ,i saconcave measure function if it can be written as
where f i : R R is a concave function and + i is an additive measure defined on all the subsets of N. When reservation values are concave measure functions, price increases of objects other than object 1, say, will not make an agent want to stop buying object 1. Hence, concave measure functions satisfy the gross substitutes assumption of Kelso and Crawford. Therefore, market clearing prices exist when agent's reservation values are concave measure functions. It may be argued that in the FCC spectrum auctions, buyers' reservation value functions exhibit complementarity initially and then substitutability. That is, each buyer's marginal value for additional licenses increases initially until the buyer has enough licenses to offer a basic portfolio of services to his customers; after this point, the marginal value for licenses decreases. Assuming for simplicity that all licenses (objects) are identical, let V( } ) be a reservation value function over 5 objects. Suppose that there is one seller whose reservation value for the objects is zero, and each of the Nonexistence with Supermodular and Submodular Preferences
m buyers have the reservation value function defined in Table 4 . 15 An efficient allocation is to give subset [1, 2, 3] to buyer 1, and subset [4, 5] to buyer 2, whereas an efficient divisible allocation is to give Finally, consider an example in which one agent, A, has supermodular preferences and the other agent, B, has submodular preferences ( Table 5 ). 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET MECHANISMS
It is well known that when one indivisible object is for sale, several common auction forms implement the competitive equilibrium outcome at the minimum competitive price. Under complete information about buyer reservation values, the minimum market clearing price and allocation is implemented in the sealed bid first-price auction and in the oral descendingprice auction. The sealed-bid second-price auction and the oral ascendingprice auction attain this competitive equilibrium outcome under both complete and incomplete information.
Do there exist simple market mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that assign a price to each object) which efficiently allocate multiple indivisible objects when market clearing prices exist? 16 As mentioned in Section 3.2, one setting in which such a mechanism exists is when buyers have zero marginal utility for consuming more than one object (from a set of heterogeneous objects). Under this scenario, a competitive equilibrium exists. Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [9] provide a simple (buyer) incentive-compatible ascendingbid mechanism which converges to the minimum competitive price vector under incomplete information about buyer preferences. Whether there are simple incentive compatible market mechanisms which converge to a competitive equilibrium (whenever one exists) under the more general condition that buyers may want to consume more than one object is an open question.
Simultaneous sealed bid auctionsone for each of the n objectsare analyzed in Bikhchandani [4] . Under complete information, Nash equilibria in simultaneous first-price auctions and in simultaneous second-price auctions implement the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes (when this set is nonempty). The set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium allocations in simultaneous first-price auctions is identical to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations.
Given a probability distribution on buyers' and sellers' valuations, it can be verified using Lemma 4 whether there is a positive probability that the agents will draw values which lead to nonexistence of competitive equilibrium. If with probability one market clearing prices exist, then does there exist a simple market mechanism capable of discovering these prices? Observe that when reservation values are additive (i.e., they satisfy (24)) then competitive equilibrium prices exist; a simple market mechanism which arrives at competitive equilibrium prices under a variety of informational assumptions is a set of simultaneous sealed bid auctions, one for each object. Other assumptions under which simple market mechanisms may be efficient are: (i) buyers have a common unknown balanced reservation value function (Corollary 3), and (ii) buyers' preferences satisfy the hypothesis of Proposition 3, with each buyer's type being private information.
We close with two implications for market mechanisms when market clearing prices do not exist. First, when a single object is sold (or equivalently when several units of an object are sold but each buyer needs at most one unit), then, under a wide variety of informational assumptions, the oral ascending price auction has the no regret property. That is, along the equilibrium path bidders do not wish to change their bids after learning the history of dropout behavior of others. Nonexistence of market clearing prices implies that when bidders value more than one object and have interdependent values, then simultaneous oral ascending price auctions will not have the no regret property, at least when each bidder knows his reservation value function. No matter how the objects are allocated by the auction, some bidder would want to change bids ex post if he could.
Second, it would be surprising to find a simple market mechanism that achieves allocative efficiency in a wide variety of circumstances in which the competitive equilibrium fails. 17 If market clearing prices do not exist then bundling a few of the objects together may lead to existence, with some loss of efficiency. An alternative approach is to set prices for some bundles, say those containing two or three objects, as well as for individual objects within these bundles.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF LEMMAS 2, 3, AND PROPOSITION 3
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) The feasible region in the above linear program (5) is a nonempty convex polyhedron. Thus, W i ( } ) is well-defined and finite at each y i 1 , y i 2 , ..., y in . Moreover, from the duality theorem of linear programming, the dual linear program of (5) has a finite optimal solution for each y i 1 , y i 2 , ..., y in and the value of this optimal solution is W i ( y i 1 , y i 2 , ..., y in ). The dual of (5) is
where we use the fact that the value of the dual objective function at the optimal solution is W i ( y i 1 , y i 2 , ..., y in ). Let 
where the inequality follows from (26). This establishes the concavity of W i .
(ii) There is a one-to-one correspondence between the extreme points of the unit cube in R n and the subsets of N. Let X i *=(x* i1 , x* i2 , ..., x* i 2 n &1 ) be an optimal (feasible) solution to (5) . Suppose that S l 3 S. Take any k # S l "S. Thus, y s k =0. The feasibility of X i * implies that 0x il *=a kl x il * :
a kj x ij * y s k =0.
Therefore, x il *=0 for all S l 3 S, or equivalently, if x il *>0 then S l S.A s the reservation price function is increasing, V i (S l )V i (S), for all S l S. Thus Let X i *=(x* i1 , x* i2 , ..., x* i 2 n &1 ), i=1, 2, ..., m be an optimal solution to LPR and let P*=( p 1 *, p 2 * , ..., p n *) and 6*=(? 1 *, ? 2 * , ..., ? n *) be an optimal solution to DLPR.
It is easy to show that at any optimal solution to DLPR, the consumer surplus for all agents of the same type is the same. That is ? i *=?* i$ . for all i, i$#T l , l=1, 2, and we may define ? l #? i * where i # T l . Suppose that at this optimal solution to LPR, we have x* ij 1 >0 and x* i $j 2 >0, where i, i$#T
1
. Then (19) 
where 1k 1 <k 2 <}}}<k r n. Let N 1 #[S j 1 , S j 2 , ..., S j r ] be the collection of subsets of N which are allocated to type 1 buyers at this optimal solution to LPR. That is, if S j # N 1 then x ij *>0 for some i # T 1 , and if S j $ N 1 then x* ij $ =0 for all i # T 1 . Similarly, N 2 is the set of subsets of N which are allocated to type 2 buyers. Then
where (32) follows from (19) and (33) from (15) . The remainder of the proof divides into two cases.
